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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Le problème de la « rationalisabilité » d’une fonction de choix à l’aide d’une relation de 
préférence transitive a été étudié en détail dans la littérature. En revanche, peu de résultats 
existent lorsque la relation sous-jacente n’est que quasi transitive ou acyclique. Nous 
décrivons les relations entre ces différentes formes de « rationalisabilité ». Nous identifions 
des conditions suffisantes et des conditions nécessaires qui sont valides pour tout domaine. 
Nous présentons des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes quand le domaine de la fonction de 
choix comprend tous les singletons et toutes les paires d’options d’un ensemble de référence. 
 
Mots clés : choix rationnel, quasi-transitivité, acyclicité, domaines de base 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been 
analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when 
transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical 
relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the 
transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we 
discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary 
domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for 
domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set. 
 
Key words : rational choice, quasi-transitivity, acyclicity, base domains 
 
 
1 Introduction
The intuitive conception of rational choice as optimizing behavior, irrespective of the
nature of the objective that the rational decision maker tries to optimize, has been studied
extensively in the literature. Beginning with the revealed preference theory of consumer
demand on competitive markets, which is due to Samuelson (1938, 1947 Chapter V, 1948,
1950) and Houthakker (1950), the early phase of the theory of rational choice was devoted
to the analysis of choices from budget sets only.
Uzawa (1957) and Arrow (1959) freed this theory from this exclusive concern by in-
troducing the general concept of a choice function deﬁned on the domain of all subsets
of a universal set of alternatives. Following this avenue, Sen (1971, 1982), Schwartz
(1976), Bandyopadhyay and Sengupta (1991), and many others succeeded in characteriz-
ing optimizing choice corresponding to ﬁne demarcations in the degree of consistency of
the objective to be maximized. Most notably, the theory of rational choice on such full
domains was greatly simpliﬁed by the equivalence results between several revealed pref-
erence axioms, for example, the weak axiom of revealed preference and the strong axiom
of revealed preference, whose subtle diﬀerence had been regarded as lying at the heart of
the integrability problem for a competitive consumer. However, this simpliﬁcation was
obtained at a price which some may think is much too high. Instead of assuming that
the domain of a choice function consists solely of the set of budget sets, it is assumed
that “the domain includes all ﬁnite subsets of [the universal set of alternatives for choice]
whether or not it includes any other subset” (Sen, 1971, 1982 p. 47). It deserves emphasis
that “it is not necessary that even all ﬁnite sets be included in the domain. All the results
and proofs would continue to hold even if the domain includes all pairs and triples but
not all ﬁnite sets” (Sen, 1971, 1982 pp. 48–49).
Whatever stance one may want to take vis-a`-vis Sen’s argument in favor of his domain
assumption, it is interesting to see what we can make of the concept of a rational choice
function irrespective of which assumption we care to specify on its domain, thereby fo-
cussing directly on what the logic of rational choice—and nothing else—entails in general.
A crucial step along this line was taken by Richter (1966, 1971), Hansson (1968) and
Suzumura (1976, 1977, 1983 Chapter 2) who assumed the domain of a choice function
to be an arbitrary family of non-empty subsets of an arbitrary nonempty universal set
of alternatives without any algebraic or topological structure. These authors succeeded
in axiomatizing the concept of a fully rational choice function, that is, a choice func-
tion resulting from the optimization of an underlying transitive preference ordering. Yet,
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“cold winds blow through unstructured sets” (Howard, 1971 p. xvii), and there remains
a large gap between the theory of rational choice functions with the Arrow-Sen domain
and that with the Richter-Hansson domain. In more concrete terms, the Richter-Hansson
approach has not yet delivered an axiomatization of rational choice functions where the
underlying preference relation is not fully transitive but possesses weaker properties such
as quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. The purpose of this paper is to narrow down this gap
along two lines.
In the ﬁrst place, we focus on choice functions deﬁned on what we call base domains,
which contain all singletons and pairs of alternatives included in some universal set. On
these domains, we provide axiomatizations of choice functions rationalized by preference
relations that are not fully transitive. In addition, a new characterization of transitive
rational choice is provided for those domains. The concept of a rational choice as an
optimizing choice is binary in nature in that the choice from any (possibly very large) set
is to be accounted for in terms of a binary relation. In this sense, base domains seem to
be the most natural domains to work with in the theory of rational choice. Triples need
not be included in a base domain even though consistency properties involving three or
more alternatives (namely, quasi-transitivity and acyclicity) are imposed, a feature which
distinguishes our approach from the Arrow-Sen framework.
In the second place, we develop new necessary conditions for choice functions deﬁned
on arbitrary domains to be rationalized by preference relations that are merely quasi-
transitive or acyclical. Furthermore, in the acyclical case, we present a new suﬃcient
condition, and we prove that it is weaker than a set of suﬃcient conditions in the earlier
literature.
Within the context of the consistency properties of transitivity, quasi-transitivity, and
acyclicity, we also explore the implications of all possible notions of rational choice as
an optimizing choice both on arbitrary domains and on base domains. Furthermore, we
analyze both maximal-element rationalizability and greatest-element rationalizability (see
Sen, 1997, for example).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept
of rationalizability, along with some preliminary observations. Logical relationships are
examined in Section 3. Section 4 contains our charcaterization results on base domains. In
Section 5, we present suﬃcient conditions and necessary conditions on arbitrary domains.
Section 6 concludes.
2
2 Rationalizable Choice Functions
The set of positive (nonnegative) integers is denoted by IN (IN0). For a set S, |S| is the
cardinality of S. Let X be a universal nonempty set of alternatives. X is the power
set of X excluding the empty set. A choice function is a mapping C: Σ → X such that
C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ Σ, where Σ ⊆ X with Σ = ∅ is the domain of C. In addition
to arbitrary nonempty domains, we consider binary domains which are domains Σ ⊆ X
such that {S ∈ X | |S| = 2} ⊆ Σ, and base domains which are domains Σ ⊆ X such that
{S ∈ X | |S| = 1 or |S| = 2} ⊆ Σ.
Let R ⊆ X×X be a binary relation on X. The asymmetric factor P (R) of R is given
by (x, y) ∈ P (R) if and only if (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R for all x, y ∈ X.
A relation R ⊆ X ×X is (i) reﬂexive if, for all x ∈ X, (x, x) ∈ R; (ii) complete if, for
all x, y ∈ X such that x = y, (x, y) ∈ R or (y, x) ∈ R; (iii) transitive if, for all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R] implies (x, z) ∈ R; (iv) quasi-transitive if P (R) is transitive;
(v) acyclical if, for all K ∈ IN \ {1} and for all x0, . . . , xK ∈ X, (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} implies (xK, x0) ∈ P (R); (vi) asymmetric if, for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R
implies (y, x) ∈ R.
The transitive closure of R ⊆ X × X is denoted by R, that is, for all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ R if there exist K ∈ IN and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x0 = x, xK = y and
(xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Clearly, R is transitive and, because we can set
K = 1, it follows that R ⊆ R.
The direct revealed preference relation RC ⊆ X × X of a choice function C with an
arbitrary domain Σ is deﬁned as follows. For all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ RC if there exists
S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S. The (indirect) revealed preference relation of
C is the transitive closure RC of the direct revealed preference relation RC. If Σ is a
base domain, the base relation BC ⊆ X ×X of C is deﬁned by letting, for all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ BC if x ∈ C({x, y}).
For S ∈ Σ and a relation R ⊆ X × X, the set of R-greatest elements in S is
G(S,R) = {x ∈ S | (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S}, and the set of R-maximal elements in
S is M(S,R) = {x ∈ S | (y, x) ∈ P (R) for all y ∈ S}. A choice function C is greatest-
element rationalizable if there exists a relation R on X such that C(S) = G(S,R) for all
S ∈ Σ. C is maximal-element rationalizable if there exists a relation R on X such that
C(S) =M(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ.
Depending on the properties that we might want to impose on a rationalizing rela-
tion, diﬀerent notions of rationalizability can be deﬁned. In particular, our focus is on
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transitivity, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity. We refer to those properties as consistency
conditions, and we let T,Q,A,R, and C stand for transitivity, quasi-transitivity, acyclicity,
reﬂexivity, and completeness, respectively. Each notion of rationalizability is identiﬁed
by a list of properties assumed to be satisﬁed by the rationalizing relation, followed by
the type of rationalizability (greatest-element or maximal-element rationalizability). For
example, QC-G means greatest-element rationalizability by a quasi-transitive and com-
plete relation, ARC-M is maximal-element rationalizability by an acyclical, reﬂexive, and
complete relation, etc..
We conclude this section with some preliminary results. We ﬁrst present the following
lemma, due to Samuelson (1938, 1948); see also Richter (1971). It states that the di-
rect relevaled preference relation must be contained in any greatest-element rationalizing
relation.
Lemma 1 If R greatest-element rationalizes C, then RC ⊆ R.
Proof. Suppose R greatest-element rationalizes C and (x, y) ∈ RC for some x, y ∈ X.
By deﬁnition of RC , there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S. Because R
greatest-element rationalizes C, this implies (x, y) ∈ R.
If R is transitive and greatest-element rationalizes C, it also follows that the strict
preference relation corresponding to RC must be contained in the strict preference relation
of R, that is, P (RC) ⊆ P (R) (see Bossert, 2001). On an arbitrary domain, this result is
no longer true if transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity.
Example 1 Let X = {x, y}, Σ = {{x, y}}, and C({x, y}) = {x}. The relation R deﬁned
by
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (y, x)}
is quasi-transitive and greatest-element rationalizes C but we have
P (RC) = {(x, y)} ⊆ ∅ = P (R).
Even if a greatest-element rationalizing relation R is reﬂexive and complete, P (RC)
need not be contained in P (R).
Example 2 Let X = {x, y, z, w}, Σ = {{x, z}, {x, y, w}}, and deﬁne C({x, z}) = {z}
and C({x, y, w}) = {x, w}. The relation R given by
R = (X ×X) \ {(x, z), (y, w)}
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is quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete and greatest-element rationalizes C. We have
(x, y) ∈ P (RC) and (x, y) ∈ P (R) and, hence, P (RC) ⊆ P (R).
The implication discussed above does hold on a base domain even if no consistency
requirement such as transitivity, quasi-transitivity or acyclicity is imposed.
Lemma 2 Suppose Σ is a base domain. If R greatest-element rationalizes C, then
P (RC) ⊆ P (R).
Proof. Suppose (x, y) ∈ P (RC) for some x, y ∈ X. This implies (x, y) ∈ RC and, by
Lemma 1, (x, y) ∈ R. By way of contradiction, suppose (y, x) ∈ R. Because Σ is a base
domain, {y} ∈ Σ. By the nonemptiness of C({y}), y ∈ C({y}). Hence, (y, y) ∈ RC and,
using Lemma 1 again, (y, y) ∈ R. Because Σ is a base domain, {x, y} ∈ Σ. Because
(y, x) ∈ R, (y, y) ∈ R, and R greatest-element rationalizes C, we must have y ∈ C({x, y})
and hence (y, x) ∈ RC . But this contradicts the assumption that (x, y) ∈ P (RC).
A ﬁnal preliminary observation concerns an axiom that is necessary for greatest-
element rationalizability even without any restrictions on a rationalizing relation. This
requirement is referred to as the V-axiom in Richter (1971); we call it D-congruence (D
for ‘direct revelation’) in order to have a systematic terminology throughout this paper.
D-Congruence: For all S ∈ Σ, for all x ∈ S, if (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S, then x ∈ C(S).
We state Richter’s (1971) result that D-congruence is necessary for greatest-element ra-
tionalizability by an arbitrary relation on an arbitrary domain. For completeness, we
provide a proof.
Lemma 3 If C is greatest-element rationalizable, then C satisﬁes D-congruence.
Proof. Suppose R greatest-element rationalizes C, and let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S be such
that (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S. By Lemma 1, (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S and, because R
greatest-element rationalizes C, it follows that x ∈ C(S).
Richter (1971) shows that D-congruence is not only necessary but also suﬃcient for
greatest-element rationalizability by an arbitrary binary relation on an arbitrary domain.
Moreover, the axiom is necessary and suﬃcient for greatest-element rationalizability by a
reﬂexive (but otherwise unrestricted) relation on an arbitrary domain. The requirement
remains, of course, necessary for rationalizability if we restrict attention to base domains.
However, if we add a consistency requirement such as transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or
acyclicity, D-congruence by itself is not suﬃcient for rationalizability, even on base do-
mains.
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3 Logical Relationships
We provide a full description of the logical relationships between the diﬀerent notions
of rationalizability that can be deﬁned in this setting. The possible deﬁnitions of ratio-
nalizability that can be obtained depend on which consistency requirement is adopted
(namely, transitivity, quasi-transitivity or acyclicity) and on whether reﬂexivity or com-
pleteness are added. Furthermore, a distinction between greatest-element rationalizability
and maximal-element rationalizability is made.
We state all logical relationships between the diﬀerent notions of rationality analyzed
in this paper in two theorems—one for arbitrary domains and one for base domains. For
convenience, a diagrammatic representation is employed: all axioms that are depicted
within the same box are equivalent, and an arrow pointing from one box b to another box
b′ indicates that the axioms in b imply those in b′, and the converse implication is not
true. In addition, of course, all implications resulting from chains of arrows depicted in
the diagram are valid.
Theorem 1 Suppose Σ is a general domain. Then
TRC-G, TC-G, TR-G, T-G, TRC-M, TC-M
↓
TR-M, T-M, QRC-G, QRC-M, QC-M, QR-M, Q-M
↓ ↓
ARC-G, ARC-M, AC-M, AR-M, A-M QC-G
↓ ↙ ↓
AC-G QR-G
↓ ↓
AR-G, A-G ← Q-G
Proof. We proceed as follows. In Step 1, we prove the equivalence of all axioms that
appear in the same box. In Step 2, we show that all implications depicted in the theorem
statement are valid. In Step 3, we demonstrate that no further implications are true other
than those resulting from chains of implications established in Step 2.
Step 1. We prove the equivalence of the axioms for each of the four boxes containing
more than one axiom.
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1.a. We ﬁrst prove the equivalence of the axioms in the top box.
That TRC-G, TC-G, TR-G, and T-G are equivalent follows directly from Richter’s
(1966, 1971) results.
Because maximal elements and greatest elements coincide for a reﬂexive and complete
relation, it follows that TRC-G and TRC-M are equivalent.
Finally, we show that TC-M implies TRC-M. Suppose R is a transitive and complete
relation that maximal-element rationalizes C, that is, C(S) =M(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ. Let
R′ = R ∪ {(x, x) | x ∈ X}.
It follows immediately thatR′ is reﬂexive, complete, and transitive. Furthermore, P (R′) =
P (R) and, therefore, M(S,R′) = M(S,R) = C(S) for all S ∈ Σ, which implies that R′
maximal-element rationalizes C.
1.b. Next, we prove that the axioms in the second box from the top are equivalent.
That TR-M and T-M are equivalent can be shown using the same construction as in
the proof of the equivalence of TRC-M and TC-M.
Clearly, QRC-G and QRC-M are equivalent because greatest and maximal elements
coincide for a reﬂexive and complete relation.
Next, we show that Q-M implies QRC-M. Suppose R is a quasi-transitive relation that
maximal-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne R′ by
R′ = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (y, x) ∈ P (R)}. (1)
Regardless of the properties possessed by R, R′ is always reﬂexive and complete and,
furthermore, P (R′) = P (R) and hence
G(S,R′) =M(S,R′) =M(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ. (2)
Since R is quasi-transitive and P (R′) = P (R), R′ is quasi-transitive as well.
That R′ maximal-element rationalizes C follows immediately from (2) and the as-
sumption that R maximal-element rationalizes C.
To complete this part of the proof, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of T-M
and QRC-G.
First, we show that T-M implies QRC-G. Suppose C is maximal-element rationalizable
by a transitive relation R. Deﬁne the relation R′ as in (1). As in the argument proving
the previous implication, R′ is quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete, and (2) implies
that R′ greatest-element rationalizes C.
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To prove that QRC-G implies T-M, suppose R is a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and
complete relation that greatest-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne
R′ = P (R).
R′ is transitive because R is quasi-transitive. Furthermore, we have P (R′) = P (R) and
hence
M(S,R′) =M(S,R) = G(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ, (3)
where the second equality follows from reﬂexivity and completeness of R. SinceR greatest-
element rationalizes C it follows from (3) that R′ maximal-element rationalizes C.
1.c. We prove that the axioms ARC-G and all axioms involving maximal-element
rationalizability by an acyclical relation are equivalent.
Again, the equivalence of ARC-G and ARC-M follows immediately because the great-
est and maximal elements of a reﬂexive and complete relation concide.
Finally, we show that A-M implies ARC-M. Suppose R is an acyclical relation that
maximal-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne R′ as in (1). Again, it is clear that R′ is reﬂexive
and complete. Since R is acyclical and P (R′) = P (R), R′ is acyclical as well. The
argument showing that R′ maximal-element rationalizes C is identical to the one used in
1.b.
1.d. To complete the ﬁrst part of the proof, it remains to be shown that A-G implies
AR-G. Suppose R is acyclical and greatest-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne
R′ = (R ∪ {(x, x) | x ∈ X}) \ {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, x) ∈ R and y = x}. (4)
Clearly, R′ is reﬂexive. Furthermore, by deﬁnition of R′, we have
[(x, x) ∈ R⇒ (x, y) ∈ R′] for all x ∈ X, for all y ∈ X \ {x}. (5)
Now suppose R′ is not acyclical. Then there exist K ∈ IN \ {1} and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X
such that (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R′) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (xK , x0) ∈ P (R′). Clearly, we can,
without loss of generality, assume that the xk are pairwise distinct. By (5), (xk−1, xk−1) ∈
R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K + 1}. But this implies that we have (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (xK , x0) ∈ P (R) by deﬁnition of R′, contradicting the acyclicity of R.
We now prove that R′ greatest-element rationalizes C. For future reference, note that
the argument used in the proof does not depend on any of the properties of R other than
the observation that it greatest-element rationalizes C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
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Suppose x ∈ C(S). Because R greatest-element rationalizes C, we have (x, y) ∈ R for
all y ∈ S which, in particular, implies (x, x) ∈ R. Therefore, by (4), (x, y) ∈ R′ for all
y ∈ S and hence x ∈ G(S,R′).
Now suppose x ∈ G(S,R′). Therefore, (x, y) ∈ R′ for all y ∈ S. If S = {x}, x ∈ C(S)
follows from the nonemptiness of C(S). If there exists y ∈ S such that y = x, (5)
implies (x, x) ∈ R. Therefore, because (x, y) ∈ R′ implies (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S and R
greatest-element rationalizes C, we immediately obtain x ∈ C(S).
Step 2. The only nontrivial implication is that QC-G implies QR-G. Suppose R is
quasi-transitive and complete and greatest-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne the (reﬂexive)
relation R′ as in (4). Next, we prove that R′ is quasi-transitive. Suppose (x, y) ∈ P (R′)
and (y, z) ∈ P (R′). By (5), (x, x) ∈ R and (y, y) ∈ R. Suppose (x, y) ∈ P (R). Because
R is complete, we have (y, x) ∈ R. Because (y, y) ∈ R, it follows that (y, x) ∈ R′ by
deﬁnition of R′, contradicting (x, y) ∈ P (R′). Therefore, (x, y) ∈ P (R).
We now distinguish two cases.
Case a. (z, z) ∈ R. Analogously to the above proof demonstrating that (x, y) ∈
P (R), we obtain (y, z) ∈ P (R) in this case. Because R is quasi-transitive, it follows
that (x, z) ∈ P (R). Because (x, x) ∈ R and (x, z) ∈ P (R), we must have (x, z) ∈ R′
by deﬁnition of R′. Furthermore, (z, x) ∈ R implies (z, x) ∈ R′ by deﬁnition of R′ and,
consequently, we obtain (x, z) ∈ P (R′).
Case b. (z, z) ∈ R. By (5), we obtain (z, x) ∈ R′. Suppose (x, z) ∈ R′. Because
(x, x) ∈ R, this implies (x, z) ∈ R by deﬁnition of R′ and hence (z, x) ∈ P (R) by the
completeness of R. Because R is quasi-transitive, we obtain (z, y) ∈ P (R) and hence
(y, z) ∈ R. Because (z, z) ∈ R, the deﬁnition of R′ implies (y, z) ∈ R′, contradicting
(y, z) ∈ P (R′). Therefore, (x, z) ∈ R′ and, because (z, x) ∈ R′, it follows that (x, z) ∈
P (R′).
That R′ greatest-element rationalizes C can be shown using the same proof as in 1.d.
Step 3. To prove that no further implications other than those resulting from Step
2 are valid, it is suﬃcient to provide examples showing that (a) QRC-G does not imply
T-G; (b) QC-G does not imply ARC-G; (c) ARC-G does not imply Q-G; (d) QR-G does
not imply AC-G; and (e) Q-G does not imply QR-G.
3.a. QRC-G does not imply T-G.
Example 3 Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = X \ {{x, y, z}}. Deﬁne the choice function
C by letting C({t}) = {t} for all t ∈ X, C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C({x, z}) = {z}, and
C({y, z}) = {y, z}. This choice function is greatest-element rationalizable by the quasi-
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transitive, reﬂexive, and complete relation
R = (X ×X) \ {(x, z)}.
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a transitive relation R′. Because x ∈
C({x, y}), we must have (x, x) ∈ R′ and (x, y) ∈ R′. Analogously, y ∈ C({y, z}) implies
(y, z) ∈ R′. By the transitivity of R′, it follows that (x, z) ∈ R′ and, together with
(x, x) ∈ R′, x ∈ C({x, z}), contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
3.b. QC-G does not imply ARC-G.
Example 4 Let X = {x, y, z, w} and Σ = {{x, w}, {y, z}, {y, w}, {x, y, w}, {y, z, w}},
and deﬁne C({x, w}) = {w}, C({y, z}) = {y}, C({y, w}) = {y, w}, C({x, y, w}) = {w},
and C({y, z, w}) = {y}. This choice function is greatest-element rationalized by the quasi-
transitive and complete relation R given by
{(x, y), (x, z), (x, w), (y, y), (y, z), (y,w), (z, x), (z, y), (z,w), (w, x), (w, y), (w,w)}.
Suppose R′ is acyclical, reﬂexive, and complete and greatest-element rationalizes C.
Because C({y, z}) = {y} and R′ is reﬂexive, we obtain (y, z) ∈ P (R′). Analogously,
because C({x, w}) = {w} and R′ is reﬂexive, we must have (w, x) ∈ P (R′).
Because y ∈ C({y, w}) and y ∈ C({x, y, w}), we must have (y, x) ∈ R′ and, because
R′ is complete, it follows that (x, y) ∈ P (R′). Analogously, because w ∈ C({y, w}) and
w ∈ C({y, z, w}), we must have (w, z) ∈ R′ and, because R′ is complete, it follows that
(z, w) ∈ P (R′).
Therefore, we have established that (x, y) ∈ P (R′), (y, z) ∈ P (R′), (z, w) ∈ P (R′),
and (w, x) ∈ P (R′), contradicting the acyclicity of R′.
3.c. ARC-G does not imply Q-G.
Example 5 Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = X \ {{x, y, z}}. Deﬁne the choice function
C by letting C({t}) = {t} for all t ∈ X, C({x, y}) = {x}, C({x, z}) = {x, z}, and
C({y, z}) = {y}. This choice function is greatest-element rationalizable by the acyclical,
reﬂexive, and complete relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, z), (y, y), (y, z), (z, x), (z, z)}.
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a quasi-transitive relation R′. Because
y ∈ C({y, z}), we have (y, y) ∈ R′. Therefore, y ∈ C({x, y}) implies (x, y) ∈ P (R′).
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Analogously, z ∈ C({x, z}) implies (z, z) ∈ R′ and, therefore, z ∈ C({y, z}) implies
(y, z) ∈ P (R′). Because R′ is quasi-transitive, it follows that (x, z) ∈ P (R′) and hence
(z, x) ∈ R′. Because R′ greatest-element rationalizes C, this implies z ∈ C({x, z}),
contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
3.d. QR-G does not imply AC-G.
Example 6 Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = {{x, y}, {x, z}, {x, y, z}}. Deﬁne the choice
function C by letting C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C({x, z}) = {x, z}, and C({x, y, z}) = {x}. C
is greatest-element rationalizable by the quasi-transitive and reﬂexive relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, z), (y, x), (y, y), (z, x), (z, z)},
but it cannot be greatest-element rationalized by a complete relation. By way of contra-
diction, suppose R′ is such a relation. By completeness, we must have
(y, z) ∈ R′ (6)
or
(z, y) ∈ R′. (7)
Suppose (6) is true. Because R′ greatest-element rationalizes C and y ∈ C({x, y}), it
follows that (y, x) ∈ R′ and (y, y) ∈ R′. Together with (6) and the greatest-element
rationalizability of C by R′, we obtain y ∈ C({x, y, z}), contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
Now suppose (7) is true. Because R′ greatest-element rationalizes C and z ∈ C({x, z}),
it follows that (z, x) ∈ R′ and (z, z) ∈ R′. Together with (7) and the greatest-element
rationalizability of C by R′, we obtain z ∈ C({x, y, z}), contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
3.e. Q-G does not imply QR-G.
Example 7 Let X = {x, y, z, w} and Σ = {{x, y}, {y, z}, {z, w}, {x, z, w}}, and deﬁne
the choice function C by letting C({x, y}) = {y}, C({y, z}) = {z}, C({z, w}) = {z, w},
and C({x, z, w}) = {w}. This choice function is greatest-element rationalized by the
quasi-transitive relation R given by
{(x, y), (y, x), (y, y), (z, y), (z, z), (z, w), (w, x), (w, z), (w,w)}.
Suppose R′ is quasi-transitive and reﬂexive and greatest-element rationalizes C. By re-
ﬂexivity, (x, x) ∈ R′ and, because x ∈ C({x, y}), we must have (y, x) ∈ P (R′). Because
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y ∈ C({x, y}), it follows that (y, y) ∈ R′ and, hence, y ∈ C({y, z}) implies (z, y) ∈ P (R′).
By quasi-transitivity, we obtain (z, x) ∈ P (R′).
Because z ∈ C({z, w}), it follows that (z, z) ∈ R′ and (z, w) ∈ R′. Together with
(z, x) ∈ P (R′) and the assumption that R′ greatest-element rationalizes C, we obtain
z ∈ C({x, z, w}), which contradicts the deﬁnition of C.
Regarding the implications presented in the above theorem, it is worth pointing out
some surprising diﬀerences between those notions of rationalizability encompassing tran-
sitivity and those that merely require quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. Most strikingly, as
soon as we weaken full transitivity to quasi-transitivity, not even reﬂexivity is implied as
a property of a greatest-element rationalizing relation. On the other hand, all notions
of maximal-element rationalizability coincide if merely quasi-transitivity rather than full
transitivity is required.
The results regarding the logical relationships between our rationalizability axioms
simplify dramatically when base domains are considered. The presence of all one-element
and two-element sets in Σ guarantees that every greatest-element rationalizing relation
must be reﬂexive and complete and, as a consequence, all rationality requirements in-
volving greatest-element rationalizability with a given consistency requirement become
equivalent. All implications of Theorem 1 are preserved and, other than those just men-
tioned, there are no additional ones. Those demanding transitivity are stronger than
those where merely quasi-transitivity is required which, in turn, imply (but are not im-
plied by) all axioms where the rationalizing relation is acyclical. These observations are
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose Σ is a base domain. Then
TRC-G, TC-G, TR-G, T-G, TRC-M, TC-M
↓
TR-M, T-M, QRC-G, QC-G, QR-G, Q-G, QRC-M, QC-M, QR-M, Q-M
↓
ARC-G, AC-G, AR-G, A-G, ARC-M, AC-M, AR-M, A-M
Proof. We divide the proof into the same three steps as in Theorem 1.
Step 1. We prove the equivalence of the axioms for each of the three boxes.
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1.a. The equivalence of the axioms in the top box follows from Theorem 1.
1.b. Now consider the axioms in the second box. Given Theorem 1, it is suﬃcient to
prove that Q-G implies QRC-G. Suppose R is a quasi-transitive relation that rationalizes
C. Because Σ is a base domain, {x} ∈ Σ for all x ∈ X. Because C(S) is nonempty for
all S ∈ Σ, it follows that (x, x) ∈ RC for all x ∈ X and, by Lemma 1, (x, x) ∈ R for all
x ∈ X. Hence R is reﬂexive. Analogously, because Σ is a base domain, {x, y} ∈ Σ for all
x, y ∈ X such that x = y, and the nonemptiness of C(S) for all S ∈ Σ implies (x, y) ∈ RC
or (y, x) ∈ RC for all x, y ∈ X such that x = y. Using Lemma 1 again, it follows that R
is complete. Thus, QRC-G is satisﬁed.
1.c. That the axioms in the last box are equivalent follows from Theorem 1 and the
assumption that Σ is a base domain as in 1.b.
Step 2. The implications in the theorem statement are trivial.
Step 3. To prove that no further implications are valid, Examples 3 and 5 can be
employed.
As shown in Theorem 2, there are only three diﬀerent versions of rationalizability for
base domains. As a consequence, we can restrict attention to the rationalizability axioms
TRC-G, QRC-G, and ARC-G in this case, keeping in mind that, by Theorem 2, all other
rationalizability requirements discussed in this paper are covered as well by our results.
Note that, in the case of transitive greatest-element rationalizability, all deﬁnitions
of rationalizability are equivalent even if Σ only contains all two-element sets but not
necessarily the singletons; this is a consequence of the observation that if R is a transitive
(and complete) relation greatest-element rationalizing C, it is always possible to ﬁnd a
reﬂexive and transitive (and complete) relation that contains R and rationalizes C as well;
see Richter (1966, 1971). Therefore, the equivalence of all axioms involving a transitive
greatest-element rationalization can be established for binary domains as well. We do
not state the corresponding result formally as a separate theorem because our focus is on
quasi-transitive and acyclical rationalizability in this paper.
4 Characterizations for Binary and Base Domains
If we restrict attention to base domains (that is, domains Σ that contain all one-element
and two-element sets), the analysis of quasi-transitive and acyclical rationalizability is
signiﬁcantly less complex than in the case of an arbitrary domain, and we obtain ‘clean’
characterization results. In addition, we formulate a new characterization result regarding
transitive rationalizability for binary domains. The full power of a base domain is not
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required in the transitive case because reﬂexivity can always be added as a property of a
rationalizing relation as long as transitivity is satisﬁed.
Note that the assumption of having a base domain diﬀers in an important aspect from
the assumption used by Sen (1971), which stipulates that not only the sets of cardinality
two, but also those of cardinality three are in Σ. (Sen did not require the singletons to be
in the domain due to the observation that, for transitive greatest-element rationalizability,
reﬂexivity can always be added as a property of a greatest-element rationalizing relation—
see the discussion at the end of the previous section.) It is interesting to note that, in
order to obtain useful and applicable results for quasi-transitive and acyclical rationalizing
relations, those sets of cardinality three are not required in the domain, even though
these consistency properties impose restrictions on three or more alternatives which may
be distinct. It is not suﬃcient to assume that we have a binary domain (that is, a
domain containing all two-element sets). The singleton sets are needed if transitivity is
weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity because, without full transitivity, reﬂexivity
of a rationalizing relation can no longer be guaranteed. Base domains have also been used
by Herzberger (1973) but he did not pursue the same questions we address in this paper.
4.1 Transitive Rationalizability
In the case of binary domains, we obtain a new characterization of TRC-G that employs
a weaker axiom than Richter’s (1966) congruence axiom to be deﬁned in Section 5. This
axiom–which we call T-congruence—is deﬁned as follows.
T-Congruence: For all x, y, z ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ RC , (y, z) ∈ RC , x ∈ S and
z ∈ C(S), then x ∈ C(S).
Note that, in contrast to congruence, T-congruence does not apply to chains of direct
revealed preference of an arbitrary length but merely to chains involving three elements.
For binary domains, T-congruence is necessary and suﬃcient for TRC-G. Of course, T-
congruence is necessary for greatest-element rationalizability by a transitive relation on
an arbitrary domain but it is not suﬃcient unless speciﬁc domain assumptions are made.
Example 8 Let X = {x, y, z, w}, Σ = {{x, y}, {y, z}, {z, w}, {x,w}}, and deﬁne C by
C({x, y}) = {x}, C({y, z}) = {y}), C({z, w}) = {z}, and C({x, w}) = {w}. This choice
function satisﬁes T-congruence but it is not greatest-element rationalizable by a transitive
relation. To see this, suppose R is transitive and greatest-element rationalizes C. The
deﬁnition of C yields (x, y) ∈ RC , (y, z) ∈ RC, (z, w) ∈ RC , and (x, x) ∈ RC . By Lemma
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1, (x, y) ∈ R, (y, z) ∈ R, (z, w) ∈ R, and (x, x) ∈ R. Because R is transitive, we
must have (x, w) ∈ R. By deﬁnition of greatest-element rationalizability, it follows that
x ∈ C({x, w}), a contradiction.
It is an interesting observation that binary domains are suﬃcient to obtain results of
that nature involving transitivity, even though those domains do not necessarily contain
all triples. This is in contrast to Sen’s (1971) results which crucially depend on having all
triples available in the domain. We obtain
Theorem 3 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. C satisﬁes TRC-G if and only if C satisﬁes
T-congruence.
Proof. Let Σ be a binary domain. This implies that RC is complete—see the proof of
Theorem 2.
Step 1. That TRC-G implies T-congruence follows immediately from Richter’s (1966)
result and the observation that T-congruence is weaker than his congruence axiom.
Step 2. We show that T-congruence implies TRC-G. Let
R = RC ∪ {(x, x) | x ∈ X}.
Clearly, R is reﬂexive by deﬁnition, and R is complete because RC is complete. Next, we
prove that R is transitive. Suppose (x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R for some x, y, z ∈ X. If
x = z, (x, z) ∈ R follows from the reﬂexivity of R. If x = z, it follows that {x, z} ∈ Σ
because Σ is a binary domain. By T-congruence, x ∈ C({x, z}) and hence (x, z) ∈ RC
which, by Lemma 1, implies (x, z) ∈ R.
Finally, we show that R greatest-element rationalizes C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). This implies (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S and hence (x, y) ∈ R for all
y ∈ S. Hence, x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ G(S,R), that is, (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S. If S = {x}, we have
C(S) = {x} because C(S) is nonempty and hence (x, x) ∈ RC . If there exists y ∈ S such
that y = x, it follows that (x, y) ∈ RC and, by deﬁnition of RC , x must be chosen for
some feasible set in Σ. Thus, again, (x, x) ∈ RC . Therefore, (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S.
Let z ∈ C(S). This implies (z, z) ∈ RC . Because z ∈ S, (x, z) ∈ RC . Letting y = z in
the deﬁnition of T-congruence, the axiom implies x ∈ C(S).
Clearly, if Σ is a base domain rather than merely a binary domain, RC is reﬂexive and
can be used as the rationalizing relation in the above theorem.
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4.2 Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability
To obtain a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for QRC-G in the case of a base
domain, we add the following Q-congruence axiom to the D-congruence axiom introduced
in Section 2.
Q-Congruence: For all x, y, z ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ P (RC), (y, z) ∈ P (RC) and
x ∈ S, then z ∈ C(S).
Together with D-congruence, Q-congruence guarantees that the direct revealed preference
relation RC is quasi-transitive. Note, again, that we do not need to impose a restriction
regarding chains of (strict) revealed preferences of arbitrary length. We obtain
Theorem 4 Suppose Σ is a base domain. C satisﬁes QRC-G if and only if C satisﬁes
D-congruence and Q-congruence.
Proof. Let Σ be a base domain. Therefore, RC is reﬂexive and complete—see the proof
of Theorem 2.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that QRC-G implies Q-congruence (that D-congruence is
implied follows from Lemma 3). Suppose R is a quasi-transitive relation that greatest-
element rationalizes C. Let x, y, z ∈ X and S ∈ Σ be such that (x, y) ∈ P (RC), (y, z) ∈
P (RC), and x ∈ S. By Lemma 2, (x, y) ∈ P (R) and (y, z) ∈ P (R) and, because R is
quasi-transitive, (x, z) ∈ P (R). This implies (z, x) ∈ R and because R greatest-element
rationalizes C, we have z ∈ C(S).
Step 2. We show that D-congruence and Q-congruence together imply QRC-G. First,
we prove that RC is quasi-transitive. Suppose (x, y) ∈ P (RC) and (y, z) ∈ P (RC) for some
x, y, z ∈ X. Because Σ is a base domain, {x, z} ∈ Σ. By Q-congruence, z ∈ C({x, z})
and hence x ∈ C({x, z}) which implies (x, z) ∈ RC. Since R is reﬂexive, (z, z) ∈ RC.
If (z, x) ∈ RC, D-congruence implies z ∈ C({x, z}), a contradiction. Therefore, (x, z) ∈
P (RC).
The rest of the proof proceeds as in Richter (1971) by showing thatRC greatest-element
rationalizes C, given D-congruence. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S. Suppose x ∈ C(S). This
implies (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S and hence x ∈ G(S,RC). Now suppose x ∈ G(S,RC),
that is, (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S. By D-congruence, x ∈ C(S).
D-congruence and Q-congruence are independent on base domains, as shown by means
of the following examples.
Example 9 Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = X \ {{x, y, z}}, and deﬁne C({t}) = {t} for all
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t ∈ X, C({x, y}) = {x}, C({y, z}) = {y}, and C({x, z}) = {z}. This choice function
satisﬁes D-congruence but violates Q-congruence.
Example 10 Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = X , and deﬁne C({t}) = {t} for all t ∈ X,
C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C({y, z}) = {y, z}, C({x, z}) = {x, z}, and C({x, y, z}) = {y, z}.
This choice function satisﬁes Q-congruence but violates D-congruence.
Q-congruence is a weaker axiom than the quasi-transitivity of RC ; it is only in con-
junction with D-congruence that it implies that the revealed preference relation is quasi-
transitive. Strengthening Q-congruence to the quasi-transitivity of RC does not allow us
to drop D-congruence in the above characterization. Note that the above example show-
ing that Q-congruence does not imply D-congruence is such that RC is quasi-transitive,
and recall that D-congruence is necessary for greatest-element rationalizability on any
domain (Lemma 3).
Given that we employ a base domain, it is natural to ask whether the base relation
BC could be used in place of the revealed preference relation RC in the formulation of
D-congruence and Q-congruence. This is not the case.
Example 11 Let X = {x, y, x} and Σ = X , and deﬁne C({t}) = {t} for all t ∈ X,
C({x, y}) = {y}, C({x, z}) = {z}, C({y, z}) = {y, z}, and C({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}. This
choice function satisﬁes the modiﬁcations of D-congruence and Q-congruence where RC
is replaced with BC but it does not satisfy D-congruence (and, thus, fails to be greatest-
element rationalizable by any binary relation). Note that replacing RC with BC leads to
a weakening of D-congruence but to a strengthening of Q-congruence.
4.3 Acyclical Rationalizability
If quasi-transitivity is weakened to acyclicity, it seems natural to replace Q-congruence by
the following A-congruence axiom in order to obtain a characterization of the respective
rationalizability property on a base domain.
A-Congruence: For all x, y ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ P (RC), x ∈ S and y ∈ C(S),
then x ∈ C(S).
It is indeed the case that D-congruence and A-congruence together are necessary and
suﬃcient for ARC-G on base domains. However, A-congruence by itself is stronger than
the acyclicity of RC and, thus, a stronger characterization result can be obtained by
employing acyclicity instead of A-congruence.
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Theorem 5 Suppose Σ is a base domain. C satisﬁes ARC-G if and only if C satisﬁes
D-congruence and RC is acyclical.
Proof. Let Σ be a base domain. Again, it follows that RC is reﬂexive and complete.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that ARC-G implies that RC is acyclical (again, that D-
congruence is implied follows from Lemma 3).
Suppose R is an acyclical, reﬂexive, and complete relation that greatest-element ra-
tionalizes C. Let K ∈ IN \ {1} and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X be such that (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (RC)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By Lemma 2, (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Because
R is acyclical, we have (xK , x0) ∈ P (R) and, since R is complete, (x0, xK) ∈ R. Be-
cause R is reﬂexive, (xK , xK) ∈ R. Because Σ is a base domain, {x0, xK} ∈ Σ. Because
R greatest-element rationalizes C, x0 ∈ C({x0, xK}) and hence (x0, xK) ∈ RC , which
implies (xK, x0) ∈ P (RC).
Step 2. D-congruence and the acyclicity of RC together imply ARC-G because D-
congruence implies that RC greatest-element rationalizes C, as was shown in the last
paragraph of the proof of Theorem 4.
That D-congruence and the acyclicity of RC are independent is shown by Examples 9
and 10. Analogously, D-congruence cannot be replaced with an axiom that merely applies
to the base relation BC instead of RC .
5 Conditions for Arbitrary Domains
In this section, we examine greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element ratio-
nalizability on completely arbitrary domains under various assumptions regarding the
properties of a rationalizing relation. For each of the consistency conditions quasi-
transitivity and acyclicity, we examine new necessary conditions and suﬃcient conditions
for rational choice. In order to put our new results in perspective, we begin with a state-
ment of Richter’s (1996) well-known result characterizing TRC-G for arbitrary domains.
5.1 Transitive Rationalizability
Richter (1966) shows that the congruence axiom is necessary and suﬃcient for TRC-G.
Congruence is deﬁned as follows.
Congruence: For all x, y ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ RC , y ∈ C(S) and x ∈ S, then
x ∈ C(S).
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We obtain
Theorem 6 C satisﬁes TRC-G if and only if C satisﬁes congruence.
Proof. See Richter (1966).
An alternative condition that is equivalent to TRC-G is Houthakker’s axiom of revealed
preference; see, for example, Suzumura (1983, p. 48).
5.2 Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability
If we move from a base domain to an arbitrary domain, the conjunction of Q-congruence
and D-congruence ceases to be suﬃcient for QRC-G, as can be seen from Example 4.
Moreover, Q-congruence is not a necessary condition for QRC-G either, as demonstrated
by the following example.
Example 12 Let X = {x, y, z, u, v, w}, Σ = {{x, y, u}, {x, z, w}, {y, z, v}}, and deﬁne
C({x, y, u}) = {x, u}, C({x, z, w}) = {z, w}, and C({y, z, v}) = {y, v}. This choice
function is greatest-element rationalizable by the quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete
relation R given by
{(x, t) | t ∈ X \ {w}} ∪ {(y, t) | t ∈ X \ {u}} ∪ {(z, t) | t ∈ X \ {v}}
∪{(u, t) | t ∈ X} ∪ {(v, t) | t ∈ X} ∪ {(w, t) | t ∈ X}.
Since (x, y) ∈ P (RC) and (y, z) ∈ P (RC), Q-congruence requires z ∈ C({x, z, w}), con-
tradicting the deﬁnition of C.
The formulation of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for greatest-element or maximal-
element rationalizability by a quasi-transitive relation is a complex task. We will return
to this issue at the end of this subsection. It is not too diﬃcult to ﬁnd plausible suﬃcient
conditions and necessary conditions, though. We begin by stating a known result pre-
senting a suﬃcient condition for QRC-G (and, thus, all rationality requirements involving
rationalizability by a quasi-transitive relation).
To do so, we deﬁne the relation EC by letting, for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ EC if
there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S \ C(S).
This relation has been used by Suzumura (1976). The following axiom turns out to be
suﬃcient for QRC-G.
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Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference: For all x, y ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ EC
and x ∈ S, then y ∈ C(S).
Note that, by deﬁnition, EC contains P (RC) and, consequently, the strong axiom of
revealed preference is stronger than Q-congruence.
We obtain
Theorem 7 If C satisﬁes the strong axiom of revealed preference, then C satisﬁes QRC-
G. The converse implication is not true.
Proof. See Suzumura (1983, p. 50).
A condition that is equivalent to the strong axiom of revealed preference (and, thus,
an alternative suﬃcient condition for QRC-G) is Uzawa’s axiom of revealed preference;
see, for example, Suzumura (1983, p. 48).
Now we present a condition that is necessary but not suﬃcient for QRC-G, even if
combined with D-congruence. This axiom involves a recursive construction. The idea is
to identify circumstances that force a strict preference between two elements of X and
impose a condition ensuring that this forced strict preference is transitive, as required by
the quasi-transitivity of a rationalizing relation.
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and com-
plete relation R. Consider a feasible set S ∈ Σ and distinct elements x, y ∈ S such that
y is not chosen in S but y is directly revealed preferred to all z ∈ S \ {x, y}. By Lemma
1, (y, z) ∈ R for all z ∈ S \ {x, y} and, together with the reﬂexivity and completeness of
R, y ∈ S \ C(S) requires that x be declared strictly preferred to y according to R and,
by quasi-transitivity, all chains of strict preference thus established must be respected as
well. Moreover, once it is implied that x is declared strictly preferred to y according to
the above argument (or, more generally, according to the transitive closure of the rela-
tion thus obtained), this strict preference may have further implications: there may exist
another set T ∈ Σ such that x, y ∈ T , x is declared preferred to all z ∈ T \ {x, y, w} for
some w ∈ S \ {x, y}, and x is not chosen in T . In that case, we must declare a strict
preference for w over x according to R. This procedure can be repeated recursively, and
we now present a formal deﬁnition of this recursion, followed by a necessary condition
for QRC-G based on this recursive construction. This recursion is analogous to the one
employed in Bossert (2001).
Deﬁne the relation F 0C on X as follows. For all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ F 0C if
there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ S \ {y}, y ∈ S \ C(S),
and (y, z) ∈ RC for all z ∈ S \ {x, y}.
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Now let i ∈ IN. Let J i−1C = RC ∪ F i−1C , and deﬁne the relation F iC on X as follows.
For all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ F iC if
[(x, y) ∈ F i−1C ] or [there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ S \ {y}, y ∈ S \ C(S),
and (y, z) ∈ J i−1C for all z ∈ S \ {x, y}].
Finally, let J∞C = ∪i∈IN0J iC and F∞C = ∪i∈IN0F iC. The following axiom turns out to be
necessary for QRC-G.
Recursive Q-Congruence: For all x, y ∈ X, if (x, y) ∈ F∞C , then (y, x) ∈ J∞C .
We obtain
Theorem 8 If C satisﬁes QRC-G, then C satisﬁes recursive Q-congruence. The converse
implication is not true.
Proof. Suppose R is a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete relation that greatest-
element rationalizes C. We ﬁrst prove that
F∞C ⊆ P (R). (8)
Clearly, by deﬁnition of F∞C , it is suﬃcient to prove that F
i
C ⊆ P (R) for all i ∈ IN0. We
proceed by induction.
Step 1. i = 0. We ﬁrst show that F 0C ⊆ P (R). Suppose (x, y) ∈ F 0C for some x, y ∈ X.
By deﬁnition, there exists S ∈ Σ such that (y, z) ∈ RC for all z ∈ S \ {x, y}, x ∈ S \ {y},
and y ∈ S \ C(S). By Lemma 1, (y, z) ∈ R for all z ∈ S \ {x, y} and, because R is
reﬂexive, (y, y) ∈ R. Because y ∈ S \ C(S) and R greatest-element rationalizes C, we
must have (y, x) ∈ R. Hence, because R is complete, (x, y) ∈ P (R).
Because R is quasi-transitive (that is, P (R) is transitive) and F 0C is the transitive
closure of F 0C , it follows that F
0
C ⊆ P (R).
Step 2. Let i ∈ IN and suppose F jC ⊆ P (R) for all j ∈ {0, . . . , i− 1}. Let (x, y) ∈ F iC
for some x, y ∈ X. By deﬁnition, there are two cases.
2.a. (x, y) ∈ F i−1C . In this case, (x, y) ∈ P (R) follows from the induction hypothesis.
2.b. There exists S ∈ Σ such that (y, z) ∈ J i−1C for all z ∈ S \ {x, y}, x ∈ S \ {y},
and y ∈ S \ C(S). Let z ∈ S \ {x, y}. By deﬁnition of J i−1C we have (y, z) ∈ RC or
(y, z) ∈ F i−1C . If (y, z) ∈ RC, Lemma 1 implies (y, z) ∈ R. If (y, z) ∈ F i−1C , (y, z) ∈ R
follows from the induction hypothesis. Therefore, (y, z) ∈ R for all z ∈ S \ {x, y} and,
using the same argument as in Step 1, we obtain F iC ⊆ P (R) and, by the quasi-transitivity
of R, F iC ⊆ P (R). This completes the proof of (8).
21
Next, we prove that
J∞C ⊆ R. (9)
Again, it is suﬃcient to prove that J iC ⊆ R for all i ∈ IN0. Let (x, y) ∈ J iC for some
x, y ∈ X. By deﬁnition, (x, y) ∈ RC or (x, y) ∈ F iC . If (x, y) ∈ RC , (x, y) ∈ R follows
from Lemma 1. If (x, y) ∈ F iC, (x, y) ∈ R follows from the proof of (8). Therefore, (9) is
true.
To complete the proof that QRC-G implies recursive Q-congruence, we proceed by
contradiction. Suppose recursive Q-congruence is violated. Then there exists x, y ∈ X
such that (x, y) ∈ F∞C and (y, x) ∈ J∞C . By (8) and (9), we have (x, y) ∈ P (R) and
(y, x) ∈ R, a contradiction.
To see that the converse implication is not true, consider the following example.
Example 13 Let X = {x, y, z, u, v, w} and Σ = {{x, y, u}, {y, z, v}, {x, z, w}} and deﬁne
C by letting C({x, y, u}) = {x}, C({y, z, v}) = {y}, and C({x, z, w}) = {z}. It is
straightforward to check that F 0C = ∅. It follows that J0C = RC , J iC = J0C = RC for all
i ∈ IN, and F∞C = F iC = F 0C = ∅ for all i ∈ IN. Thus, recursive Q-congruence is trivially
satisﬁed. Because we will use this example in the following subsection as well, we show that
C cannot be greatest-element rationalized by an acyclical, reﬂexive, and complete relation
(and, thus, it cannot be greatest-element rationalized by a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and
complete relation). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that R is acyclical, reﬂexive, and
complete and greatest-element rationalizes C. Because y, u ∈ {x, y, u} \ C({x, y, u}) and
R is reﬂexive and complete, we must have
1.a. (x, y) ∈ P (R) or 1.b. [(x, u) ∈ P (R) and (u, y) ∈ P (R)].
Analogously, because z, v ∈ {y, z, v} \ C({y, z, v}) and x, w ∈ {x, z, w} \ C({x, z, w}), we
have
2.a. (y, z) ∈ P (R) or 2.b. [(y, v) ∈ P (R) and (v, z) ∈ P (R)]
and
3.a. (z, x) ∈ P (R) or 3.b. [(z, w) ∈ P (R) and (w, x) ∈ P (R)].
If 1.a, 2.a, and 3.a are true, we immediately obtain a contradiction to the acyclicity
of R.
If 1.a, 2.a, and 3.b are true, we have (x, y) ∈ P (R), (y, z) ∈ P (R), (z, w) ∈ P (R), and
(w, x) ∈ P (R), contradicting the acyclicity of R. Becuase of the symmetric role played by
x, y, and z, analogous contradictions are obtained whenever statements i.a, j.a, and k.b
are true for any distinct values of i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
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If 1.a, 2.b, and 3.b are true, we obtain (x, y) ∈ P (R), (y, v) ∈ P (R), (v, z) ∈ P (R),
(z, w) ∈ P (R), and (w, x) ∈ P (R), again a violation of acyclicity. Using the symmetric
role of x, y, and z again, analogous contradictions are obtained whenever statements i.a,
j.b, and k.b are true for any distinct values of i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Finally, if 1.b, 2.b, and 2.c are true, we obtain (x, u) ∈ P (R), (u, y) ∈ P (R), (y, v) ∈
P (R), (v, z) ∈ P (R), (z, w) ∈ P (R), and (w, x) ∈ P (R), and acyclicity is violated again.
We noted in Lemma 3 that D-congruence is a necessary condition for greatest-element
rationalizability by any relation. This raises the question whether recursive Q-congruence
implies D-congruence. To see that this is indeed the case, suppose D-congruence is vio-
lated. Then there exist S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S and x ∈ C(S).
By deﬁnition, this implies (y, x) ∈ F 0C ⊆ F∞C for all y ∈ S \ {x}. Because C(S) ⊆ S is
nonempty and x ∈ S \ C(S), S \ {x} is nonempty. Consider any y ∈ S \ {x}. Because
(x, y) ∈ RC we have (x, y) ∈ J∞C . Therefore, we obtain (y, x) ∈ F∞C and (x, y) ∈ J∞C ,
contradicting recursive Q-congruence.
Furthermore, recursive Q-congruence and Q-congruence are independent. The choice
function in Example 12 satisﬁes recursive Q-congruence (by Theorem 8; note that it
satisﬁes QRC-G) but violates Q-congruence. Conversely, the choice function in Example
4 satisﬁes Q-congruence but violates recursive Q-congruence. To see this, note ﬁrst that
RC = {(y, y), (y, z), (y, w), (w, x), (w, y), (w,w)}. In view of the deﬁnition of C, it follows
that F 0C = {(x, y), (y, z), (z, w), (w, x)}, and the transitive closure of F 0C is therefore given
by F 0C = X × X. It follows that F∞C = J∞C = X × X, a contradiction to recursive
Q-congruence.
Because no particular assumptions are formulated regarding the domain of the choice
function, it seems that conditions that are both necessary and suﬃcient cannot be formu-
lated without invoking existential clauses. Moreover, contrary to the transitive case,
quasi-transitivity of a greatest-element rationalizing relation does not imply that the
asymmetric factor of the revealed preference relation must be contained in this ratio-
nalizing relation—see the discussion regarding Lemma 2 in Section 2. These observations
appear to be an important part of the reason why there does not exist much literature
on the subject of quasi-transitive rational choice on arbitrary domains. Rather than con-
structing the relation F∞C one pair of alternatives at a time, a tighter necessary condition
would be to establish the existence of an alternative x ∈ S such that x can be declared
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better than y if y is feasible but not chosen in S. This kind of condition involves an
existential clause, and conditions of that nature are diﬃcult to verify in practice and,
therefore, are of limited interest.
5.3 Acyclical Rationalizability
A-congruence (and, thus, the acyclicity of RC) fails to be suﬃcient for ARC-G even
in the presence of D-congruence, as Example 4 shows. Moreover, the acyclicity of RC
(and, thus, A-congruence) is not necessary for ARC-G in the case of a general domain.
This is established by Example 12; note that, in Example 12, we have (x, y) ∈ P (RC),
(y, z) ∈ P (RC), and (z, x) ∈ P (RC).
As is the case for quasi-transitivity, the formulation of necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for acyclical rationalizability appears to necessitate the use of axioms involving
existential clauses. We provide a discussion analogous to the one for quasi-transitivity to
illustrate the issues involved. First, we present a new suﬃcient condition for ARC-G.
Strong A-Congruence: For all x, y ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ EC ∪ RC, x ∈ S and
y ∈ C(S), then x ∈ C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 9 If C satisﬁes strong A-congruence, then C satisﬁes ARC-G. The converse
implication is not true.
Proof. Suppose C satisﬁes strong A-congruence. First, we prove that EC is asymmetric.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ EC and
(y, x) ∈ EC . Therefore, there exist K,K ′ ∈ IN, x0, . . . , xK ∈ X, and z0, . . . , zK′ ∈ X
such that x0 = zK
′
= x, xK = z0 = y, (xk−1, xk) ∈ EC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and
(zk−1, zk) ∈ EC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K ′}. Hence, (x, zK′−1) ∈ EC and (zK′−1, x) ∈ EC.
By deﬁnition of EC , there exists S ∈ Σ such that zK′−1 ∈ C(S) and x ∈ S \ C(S),
contradicting strong A-congruence.
Now deﬁne
R = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (y, x) ∈ EC} ∪RC .
Clearly, R is reﬂexive and complete by the asymmetry of EC . To prove that R is acyclical,
we ﬁrst derive the asymmetric factor of R. By deﬁnition, (x, y) ∈ P (R) if
[(y, x) ∈ EC or (x, y) ∈ RC] and [(x, y) ∈ EC and (y, x) ∈ RC ]
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which is equivalent to
[(y, x) ∈ EC and (x, y) ∈ EC and (y, x) ∈ RC ] or
[(x, y) ∈ RC and (x, y) ∈ EC and (y, x) ∈ RC ].
Using the asymmetry of EC , this is equivalent to
[(x, y) ∈ EC and (y, x) ∈ RC] or [(x, y) ∈ EC and (x, y) ∈ P (RC)]
or, equivalently,
[(x, y) ∈ EC and (y, x) ∈ RC ]. (10)
Now we establish the acyclicity of R. Suppose there existK ∈ IN\{1} and x0, . . . , xK ∈
X such that x0 = x, xK = y, (xk−1, xk) ∈ EC and (xk, xk−1) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Because EC is transitive, we have (x, y) ∈ EC and, by the asymmetry of EC , (y, x) ∈ EC.
By (10), this implies (y, x) ∈ P (R).
Finally, we show that R greatest-element rationalizes C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose ﬁrst that x ∈ C(S). This implies (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S and hence
(x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S, and we have x ∈ G(S,R).
Now suppose x ∈ G(S,R). This implies
[(y, x) ∈ EC or (x, y) ∈ RC ] for all y ∈ S. (11)
Let z ∈ C(S) ⊆ S. This implies (z, x) ∈ RC . Because z ∈ S, (11) implies
(z, x) ∈ EC (12)
or
(x, z) ∈ RC. (13)
If (12) is true, we must have x ∈ C(S) because otherwise (z, x) ∈ EC by deﬁnition
and hence (z, x) ∈ EC.
If (13) is true, x ∈ C(S) follows from strong A-congruence.
To show that strong A-congruence is not implied by ARC-G, note that Example 12 can
be employed here as well: QRC-G (and, thus, ARC-G) is satisﬁed but we have (x, z) ∈ EC
and z ∈ C({x, z, w}) and x ∈ {x, z, w} \C({x, z, w}), contradicting strong A-congruence.
Strong A-congruence is a tighter suﬃcient condition for ARC-G than the set of suﬃ-
cient conditions established in Suzumura (1983, p. 51). The conditions used in this earlier
contribution are the following.
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Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference: For all x, y ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ EC
and x ∈ S, then y ∈ C(S).
No EC-Cycles: For all x, y ∈ X, for all S ∈ Σ, if (x, y) ∈ EC, x ∈ S and y ∈ C(S), then
x ∈ C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 10 If C satisﬁes the weak axiom of revealed preference and no EC-cycles, then
C satisﬁes strong A-congruence. The converse implication is not true.
Proof. Suppose strong A-congruence is violated. Then there exist x, y ∈ X such that
(x, y) ∈ EC ∪ RC and (y, x) ∈ EC . If the weak axiom of revealed preference is satisﬁed,
it follows that (x, y) ∈ RC . Therefore, we must have (x, y) ∈ EC, and we obtain an
EC-cycle.
To see that the converse implication is not true, consider the following example.
Example 14 Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = {{x, y}, {x, y, z}} and deﬁne C by letting
C({x, y}) = {x, y} and C({x, y, z}) = {x}. It is straightforward to verify that C sat-
isﬁes strong A-congruence but violates the weak axiom of revealed preference.
To obtain a necessary condition for ARC-G, we employ a recursive construction as in
the previous subsection. Let H0C = F
0
C and, for i ∈ IN, let Li−1C = RC ∪Hi−1C and deﬁne
the relation HiC as follows. For all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ HiC if
[(x, y) ∈ Hi−1C ] or [there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ S \ {y}, y ∈ S \ C(S),
and (y, z) ∈ Li−1C for all z ∈ S \ {x, y}].
Furthermore, let L∞C = ∪i∈IN0LiC and H∞C = ∪i∈IN0HiC .
Analogously to recursive Q-congruence, the following condition is necessary for ARC-
G.
Recursive A-Congruence: For all x, y ∈ X, if (x, y) ∈ H∞C , then (y, x) ∈ L∞C .
We now obtain
Theorem 11 If C satisﬁes ARC-G, then C satisﬁes recursive A-congruence. The con-
verse implication is not true.
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Proof. Suppose R is an acyclical, reﬂexive, and complete relation that greatest-element
rationalizes C. To demonstrate that A-congruence is implied, we ﬁrst prove
H∞C ⊆ P (R). (14)
Again, by deﬁnition of H∞C , it is suﬃcient to prove that H
i
C ⊆ P (R) for all i ∈ IN0. We
proceed by induction.
Step 1. i = 0. Because H0C = F
0
C, Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 8 can be employed
to conclude that H0C ⊆ P (R).
Step 2. Let i ∈ IN and suppose HjC ⊆ P (R) for all j ∈ {0, . . . , i−1}. Let (x, y) ∈ HiC
for some x, y ∈ X. By deﬁnition, there are two cases.
2.a. (x, y) ∈ Hi−1C . In this case, (x, y) ∈ P (R) follows from the induction hypothesis.
2.b. There exists S ∈ Σ such that (y, z) ∈ Li−1C for all z ∈ S \ {x, y}, x ∈ S \ {y},
and y ∈ S \ C(S). Let z ∈ S \ {x, y}. By deﬁnition of Li−1C we have (y, z) ∈ RC or
(y, z) ∈ Hi−1C . If (y, z) ∈ RC, Lemma 1 implies (y, z) ∈ R. If (y, z) ∈ Hi−1C , there exist
K ∈ IN and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x0 = y, xK = z and (xk−1, xk) ∈ Hi−1C for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. By the induction hypothesis, (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
and the acyclicity and the completeness of R together imply (y, z) ∈ R. Therefore,
(y, z) ∈ R for all z ∈ S \ {x, y} and, using the same argument as in Step 1 of the proof of
Theorem 8, we obtain HiC ⊆ P (R). This completes the proof of (14).
Furthermore, we have
L∞C ⊆ R; (15)
the proof of this claim is analogous to the proof of (9).
To complete the proof that recursive A-congruence is satisﬁed, the same argument as
in the proof of Theorem 8 can be employed, where F∞C and J
∞
C are replaced with H
∞
C
and L∞C , and (8) and (9) are replaced with (14) and (15).
To see that the converse implication is not true, note that the choice function in
Example 13 satisﬁes recursive A-congruence (trivially because H∞C = ∅) but it cannot be
greatest-element rationalized by an acyclical relation.
Recursive A-congruence implies D-congruence; the proof is analogous to the proof
establishing that recursive Q-congruence implies D-congruence.
Furthermore, recursive A-congruence does not imply the acyclicity of RC (and, thus,
fails to imply A-congruence). This is shown by Example 13. Conversely, recursive A-
congruence is not implied by A-congruence (and, thus, it is not implied by the acyclicity
of RC; Example 4 establishes this claim.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude the paper with a brief discussion of some open problems. As mentioned in the
text, it seems very diﬃcult to obtain useful necessary and suﬃcient conditions for QRC-G
or for ARC-G on general domains. Given that very indirect implications of preference
maximization have to be taken into consideration, the nature of the problem suggests
that existential clauses have to be invoked in order to arrive at full characterizations. See
also Bossert (2001) for analogous diﬃculties in a diﬀerent framework.
If the formulation of clean necessary and suﬃcient conditions for QRC-G and for
ARC-G turns out to be too complex a task, the following more modest objective might
be an issue to be addressed in future work. Note that the strong axiom of revealed
preference, a suﬃcient condition for QRC-G, is not implied by TRC-G and, analogously,
strong A-congruence is not implied by QRC-G. Likewise, recursive Q-congruence does
not imply ARC-G. One direction in which the results of this paper could be extended is
to ﬁnd a condition that is intermediate in strength between TRC-G and QRC-G, and a
condition that is implied by QRC-G and implies ARC-G in order to obtain tighter bounds
on possible characterizations.
We conclude by remarking that the strong axiom of revealed preference cannot be
weakened to strong A-congruence to get a tighter suﬃcient condition for QRC-G (this
is established by Example 5). Similarly, recursive A-congruence cannot be strengthened
to recursive Q-congruence to get a tighter necessary condition for ARC-G (again, this is
established by Example 5).
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